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Summary  findings
The goal of economic development is to increase growth  in place before the need they address arises and when the
and eliminate poverty. Recently, the goal has been  institutions are compatible with the need's objectives.
broadened to include promoting participatory  These conditions are not easily met.
governance. Arguably, participation - for example, in  Discussions of participation cannot ignore issues of
community water committees - produces two desirable  political power, local power, populism, and
outcomes: democratic processes and better-targeted,  representation. They cannot ignore issues of moral
more efficiently delivered public services.  pluralism (the variety of ways in which people value their
Participation is desirable as an end in itself, as a means  lives) or cultural diversity. They cannot dismiss the ways
of sharing resources, control, and responsibility within  in which people can be blocked from better lives by the
the social group. Yet participation is not always related  beliefs of their cultures. They cannot avoid the pressure
to democracy. Fascism was a participatory, grassroots  that a dominant group may exert to forge solutions that
political movement.  are morally unacceptable.
Participation is as much a problem as it is a solution, as  These problems are not irrelevant or unimportant.
much a goal as a tool. It is a problem when it is  Efforts to promote participation would seem strikingly
disorderly and if it is assumed to be a substitute for  banal were the history of development efforts not replete
democratic representation.  It is a solution when it  with failures to achieve participation where it would
changes conflict into negotiated losses. Participation can  have made a difference. It has typically been assumed
make development assistance more effective, but it works  that people, especially poor people, lack the competence
best for groups that are already participatory;  for groups  to decide for themselves.
that can already help themselves.  Similarly, the failures of participation would seem
The recent literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid  strikingly banal if people, especially those we are
to developing countries presents an interesting analogy.  interested in, behaved the way we expected them to. But
Most foreign aid is useless. The only part that really  people do not behave as expected. Their interests may
helps development is that which follows rather  than  not be in the collective interest, and their goals may not
precedes policy change. Similarly, participation seems to  coincide with broader social goals.
work well only when the institutions  of participation are
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The goal of economic development is to increase growth and eliminate poverty. Recently, the
goal has been broadened to include promoting participatory governance. Arguably,
participation-such  as in community water committees, neighborhood organizations, and school
associations-produces  two desirable outcomes. One is democracy itself, the other, less
ambitious, is better targeted and more efficiently delivered public services.
Once a shout from the radical fringe, the call for participation has re-surfaced as a
dominant voice in development thinking.' But the new truth may be flawed. Participation is
desirable as an end in itself, as a means of sharing resources, control, and responsibility within the
social group. Yet participation is not always related to democracy-fascism  was a participatory
and grassroots-based political movement. Moreover, historically, social rights were not
necessarily the product of participatory democracy; in fact, participation in itself fails to resolve
the classic economic dilemma of ordering social choices. Because participation is a social act that
springs from a preexisting set of social relations it is more readily applied in situations that
condone and reinforce that set of social relations. Though it may be used for "radical" (e.g.,
redistributive) outcomes, it is essentially a conservative, pragmatic form of social action. When
used to address local problems, as it most often is, it will assign costs and benefits in accordance
to the pre-existing local distribution of power.  Thus, as a means for social change, participation
The ideas  for this paper were first discussed  during  the workshops  on partnerships  and participation  sponsored  by
the  World  Bank  in Oaxaca,  Mexico  (April,  1996)  and  Belo  Horizonte,  Brazil  (March,  1997).  We  would  like  to
thank the participants  in these  workshops  for many helpful suggestions,  and Theresa  Lobo for her encouragement,
and incisive  comments.  The usual disclaimer  applies.raises as many questions as it answers. To be taken seriously, an argument for participation should
recognize and face the issues of social organization and hierarchy-and  this has important
implications, especially for those who believe that because a process is participatory, it is
preferable to the alternatives.
Justice,  Injustice,  and the Quest  for Alternatives
The idea  that injustice  is not inevitable  is relatively  recent:
Not all that long ago, the social,  political,  and economic  order  under  which  men
and women  were living  was taken for granted....  The idea that the social order-
intermediate between the fortuitous and the unchangeable-may  be an important
cause of human unhappiness became widespread only in the modern age,
particularly in the eighteenth century (Hirschman 1986, p. 105).
The idea that injustice is not natural suggests that individuals have rights.2"To be
modern," writes Apter (1965, p. 10), "is to see life as alternatives, preferences, and choice." It is
to demand new things as rights and not only as desires. 3
The Value  of Participation
Participation is a means of acquiring new rights. It is a form of social action that is voluntary,
rational, and based on the belief that individuals (or communities) have joint interests that allow
2cooperative  solutions.  It is an instrument  for negotiating  divergent  interests;  it does not eliminates
losses  but makes  them transparent  and acceptable.
Participation,  Civil Society, and Democracy
Participation  can lead to the enfranchisement  of previously  disenfranchised  segments  of the
population.  Nevertheless,  historically,  few political  and social  rights  have  been acquired  as an
outcome  of participation.  Consider  the electoral  rule of "one person-one  vote," an outgrowth  of
the democratic  belief  that all people  share  the same  basic  political  values  irrespective  of their
position  in society.  In his examination  of modem  European  history,  Macpherson  (1977) shows
that this belief  matures  to a widely  shared  truth only  when the ruling  class is convinced  that the
poor majority  is not a threat to their rule.  The vote was granted  by the emerging  ruling  classes;  it
was not demanded  by the poor. The origin  of modem  liberal  democracy  rests on a disturbing
assumption:  The elite  compete  to rule but voters remain  apathetic. 4
If we examine  social  rights,  it is also not clear  that they derive  from participatory
movements  or democratic  pressure.  The beginning  of the modem pension  system  dates from  the
rule of Bismarck  in Germany. 5 In Latin America,  it was dictators  such as Peron in Argentina  and
Vargas  in Brazil  who pushed  for and enacted  some  of the most important  social  legislation.  For
years,  the authoritarian  Soviet  Union  was looked  upon as a model  for women's rights  legislation.
Moreover,  a dynamic  civil  society  may  fail to express  itself  politically.  Jose Murilo
Carvalho  (1987)  gives  a dismaying  description  of how Brazil  attained  its democracy.  In 1889,  the
same  population  of Rio de Janeiro  that was remarkably  well organized  in its revolt against  the
mandatory  variola  vaccination  was apathetic  to the political  movement  against  the empire.  In fact,
3most residents of the city confused the transit of military troops (part of the "palace coup" that
resulted in the First Republic) with a military parade.
Why then is participatory democracy such an attractive, unifying concept? And why does
it have so many constraints? Perhaps the concept is attractive because, as Macpherson (1977, p.
94) has argued, "low participatory and social inequalities are so bound up with each other that a
more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system." It has two
important constraints: size and the difficult path of implementation.
... most of the questions that would need to be asked in our present complex
societies could scarcely be formulated by citizen groups specifically  enough for the
answers to give a government a clear directive. Nor can the ordinary citizen be
expected to respond to the sort of questions that would be required to give a clear
direction. The questions would have to be as intricate as, for instance, having to
ask questions such as "what percent unemployment rate would you accept in order
to reduce the rate of inflation by x percent?," or, "what increase in the rate of (a)
income tax, (b) sales tax, (c) other taxes {specify  which}, would you accept in
order to increase by blank per cent (fill in the blank}, the level of (1) old age
pensions, (2) health services, (3) other social services {specify  which), (4) any
other benefits {specify  which)." (Macpherson, 1977 p. 95).
The path to, and the functioning of, participatory democracy demands citizens who are
more than consumers. They should also struggle for political power, develop capacities to acquire
political power, and enjoy the exercise of political power. All these activities are based,
presumably, on a sense of community. More important, they are predicated on a just  society or, at
4least, on a society  that views itself  as just. For harsh and deeply  felt inequalities  require  a
nonparticipatory  party system  to hold society  together.
These  various requirements  for a functioning  democracy  may  contradict  one another.
Macpherson  (1977 pp. 95-96) notes:
We seem  to be caught  in a vicious  circle.  For it is unlikely  that either of these
prerequisite  changes  could  be effected  without  stronger  democratic  participation
than there is now. The reduction  of social and economic  inequalities  is unlikely
without strong democratic  actions.  And  it would seem,  whether  we follow  Mil or
Marx, that only  through  actual involvement  in joint political  action  can people
transcend  the consciousness  of themselves  as consumers  and appropriators.  Hence
the vicious  circle:  we cannot  achieve  more democratic  participation  without a prior
change  in social  inequality  and in consciousness,  but we cannot  achieve  the
changing  social  inequality  and consciousness  without  a prior increase  in
democratic  participation.
And  the obstacles  are greater still  in developing  countries,  where  the call  for participatory
democracy  may  come before  liberal  democracy  is achieved.  There,  fractions  of the elite,  instead  of
competing  under established  ground  rules,  are often  engaged  in civil  wars. While  working  in
Angola,  one of the authors  was once told that "the civil  war is not our war; we just die in it."
Can the vicious  circle  be broken?  Can the obstacles  be reduced?  The historical  record
provides  a categorical  answer:  Yes. Incremental  benefits  and lower  inequalities  can change  the
image  people  at the bottom have  of themselves-from victims  to survivors-and this provides  a
critical  stimulus  to participation.  A crisis  may  also stimulate  social  action.  Participation,  in turn,
5pushes  for further  incremental  change  in the distributive  system.  This is evident  in the spread  of
workers' participation  in the design  of work rules,  in the long and successful  tradition  of self-
enforcement  among  professionals  in the United  Kingdom  and in the United  States, in the
phenomenal  success  of the community-based  Viva  Rio movement  after  the horrific  slaughter  of
street children  in 1995. The energy  unleashed  by participation  helps  explain  how a motley  group
in a church-based  community  movement  in Boston achieved  what the entire  police  department
could not: a significant  reduction  in juvenile  crime  rates and the suspension  of all gun-related
homicides  among  teenagers.6
The examples  are numerous  and varied  for, as Max Weber observed  (1964,  p. 35), people
want to engage  in social  relations.  People  willingly  join participatory  movements  because  through
them  they can satisfy  their interests.  They  may  like  the outcome,  they may  enjoy  the solidarity  that
the social  relation  creates,  they may  even  derive  some  compensation  from the simple  expression  of
their interests.
There is a strong  demand  for participatory  and community-based  development  programs
not because  they  promote democracy,  although  they may.  The attraction  is their capacity  to
achieve  redistribution  with incremental  localized  gains.  In the context of a specific  project,
participation  can be used to interpret  demands  and produce  a better match  between  project
outputs and local  wants; it can be used to align  the distribution  of benefits  and costs with the
needs  and aspirations  of the community.
Using  Participation  to Identify Demand
Public agencies  often  base their actions  on standards.  So many  hospital  beds per thousand  people,
so many  nurses per so many  hospital  beds, and so on. Standards  are derived  from perceived  needs
6and technical  characteristics.  As Pritchett  (1996)  has argued,  this belief,  fixed  firmly  in
bureaucratic  thinking,  has become  part of conventional  wisdom.  It has taken decades  of painful
experience  and failed  projects  to see  that it is wrong. The reliance  on needs-based  standards  is
misplaced  because  individuals  act to satisfy  demands,  which  are highly  specific  to individuals  or
groups, and governments  act to satisfy  political  interests,  which  may  not coincide  with the needs
of particular  individuals  or groups. Centralized  and technocratic  solutions  have  two consequences.
Either  the pattern of service  provision  will  be uniform  across all areas,  irrespective  of differences,
or there will be attempts  to adjust services  by "technical  coefficients"  in response  to a new set of
standards.
There is therefore  a strong case  for decentralization-for mechanisms  that enable  the
provision  of services  to be more responsive  to local preferences.  The provision  of goods and
services  should  be based on demands,  not needs.  Moreover,  the least-cost  way  to provide  goods
and services  may  not be through a framework  of universal,  free, and monopoly  provision  by
government.  Participation  is a powerful  method  of determining  demand  and helps agencies
resolve  the vexing  question  of how to provide  goods and services-and who should  provide
them.
Does Partcipation Reveal  Demand  Effectively?
Participation  by individuals  allows  institutions  to determine  what it is that people  want.  But in the
presence  of markets,  is participation  needed  to identify  demand?  Competitive  markets  allow
individuals  and households  to express  their  preferences  under a much  broader set of conditions
than  nearly  all other forms of participation,  and  they  do so  better  and  at lower  cost.  Moreover,
competitive  markets  discriminate  among  individual  demands'according  to a single  variable-
7purchasing  power.  Unlike  other social  constructs  for exchange,  markets  simultaneously  exchange
information  about  preferences,  relative  scarcities,  quality,  and reputation.  Competitive  markets
thus dominate  other  forms of participation  and exchange.
Markets,  however,  have some  well-known  limitations,  which can  be overcome  by
participatory  institutions.  Market  preference  can only  be known  and measured  after exchange.  A
market  without exchange  or with insufficient  exchange  fails  to reveal  social  preferences
adequately,  as does a market without  sufficient  competition  among  buyers  and sellers.  In
developing  countries,  despite  the widespread  and growing  use of market  institutions,  there still  are
pockets of the population  that are so loosely  integrated  with the market  that the very concept  of
market  preference  or demand  may  not apply.  In general,  preferences  revealed  in the market are
constrained  by what is supplied  to and demanded  from  the market  (an adequate  estimate  of the
demand  for airplanes  cannot  be constructed  without a well-developed  concept  of an airplane).
Markets  do not price dreams,  yet actions  (and institutions)  may  be inspired  by dreams;
preferences  may be symbolic  and difficult  (if not impossible)  to price.
Furthermore,  even  when markets  can work they  frequently  fail  to do so. Consider  the
following:  The economics  literature  on public  service  provision  has been  powerfully  influenced  by
Tiebout  (1956).8  Samuelson  (1954, 1955)  had proved that the market could  not secure an
efficient  allocation  of resources  in an economy  with both public  and private  goods. It was
defeated  by the nonexcludability  and nonrivalry  properties  of the public  good. 9 Tiebout  countered
that if public  goods were "local,"  in the sense  that benefits  were limited  to a defined  geographical
area, a quasi  market  mechanism  was restored  through  the ability  of individuals  to choose  the
jurisdiction  in which  they  lived (or, by extension,  the group with which  they  associated). 10
8As Stiglitz  (1983)  has argued,  Tiebout's  basic  insight  was to argue  that if individuals  were
mobile  among  communities,  or if they  could create  their own communities,  the three fundamental
problems  associated  with the provision  of public  goods would  be resolved.
For private  goods, individuals  reveal  their preferences  in the process of purchasing  goods;
for public  goods, the problem  of elicitation  must be resolved  some  other way.  For private  goods
consumed  individually,  individual  consumers  can decide  what and  how much  to consume  based  on
how much money  they  have,  the distribution  of prices,  their own  preferences,  and what is
available  in the market;  for public  goods, the problem  of social  choice must be resolved  some
other way.  For private  goods, firms  have  strong  incentives  to produce  the goods that consumers
want and to produce  them efficiently;  for public  goods, the problem  of production  and
management  must be resolved  some  other  way.
Tiebout  thought  that a homogeneous  community  could  resolve  these three problems:  it
would  know what it wants, in what ranking,  and at what costs. And  people  could choose  among
communities  or form their own.
Unfortunately,  the solution  is not so simple  in everyday  life.  In everyday  life,  Stiglitz
(1983)  shows  that "community-type"  solutions  are unambiguously  good solutions  only  in a very
special  case. The market allocation  solution  is faulty  when (a) there is imperfect  information  and
individuals  or groups can acquire  information  and/or  be influenced  by the actions  of others;  (b)
there are incomplete  future or risk markets;  and (c) there are economies  of scale  in production
that result in only a subset  of the set of potential  goods  being  produced.
A participatory  community  (one that creates  extramarket  mechanisms  for coordination  and
enforcement)  could address  many  of the problems  of imperfect  and incomplete  information
9(problems  (a) and (b) above);  and a system  of participatory  communities  could  face up to the
problem  of scale. To see  why, consider  the following  three common  forms of market failures:
Asymmetric  information.  Suppose  you want to borrow money  from me. If I know as
much  about  your ability  to repay  the loan  as you do, I would  be well equipped  to make a decision
about  lending  to you. But, in fact, I know less  about your ability  to repay  the loan  than you do,
making  it more difficult  for me to evaluate  the risk involved  in lending  to you. Moreover,  if you
have  information  that would help  me make a decision,  but my decision  affects  your well-being,
you may  have an incentive  not to share  all of your information  with me, a possibility  I anticipate.
As a consequence  of this asymmetry,  I make a less efficient  decision  than I otherwise  would  have.
A mediator  who has some  additional  information  about  the parties  could help  by sharing  that
information  and correcting  misinformation  held  by others.  Local credit  cooperatives  are
sometimes  able  to function  efficiently  where  banks fail  because  they share  information,  even  if
they  do not disclose  it. In this case,  trust and creditworthiness  are conditions  for participation,  and
loss of reputation  is the penalty  for misconduct.
Disreputable  information.  Markets  fail in the absence  of confidence  in the information
that is available,  and the outcome  may  be collective  paralysis.  If I lack  information  that I believe
will be made available  tomorrow,  I will likely  put off making  a decision  until  tomorrow.  One way
to reduce  the lack of confidence  is to design  contracts  with contingencies.  But no contract can
specify  all possible  contingencies.  A  joint or collective  decision  (participation)  may  be more
effective.  It reduces  uncertainty  since  the fear of uncertainty  is reduced  when one knows some  of
the events  that can most directly  affect  one's future. For example,  I may  invest  in producing
bananas  if I know that you will invest  in transporting  bananas.
10Opportunistic  behavior.  I will  not agree to something  I thinrk  you are likely  to renege  on. I
may  not like  or trust your reputation.  But if others  I trust vouch  for you, I may  go along  with the
deal. A community  commitment  may  overcome  my fear of your reputation.  Bonding,  either  by
floating  a financial  obligation  that can be used in case  of default  or by operating  within  a tight
social  group (a strong  form of participation),  attenuates  opportunistic  behavior.  But bonding
depends  critically  on the costs of monitoring,  enforcement,  and punishment.  Participation,
particularly  participation  in vertical  organizations,  helps  overcome  these difficulties.
Forms of participation  can be used, therefore,  to overcome  some  types  of market  failure.
They  can do so by creating  alternative  instruments  for collective  action.  To be sure,  the appeal  to
collective  action  introduces  another  set of problems.  If collective  action  is to be enforced,  with the
possible  penalty  of outlawing  the individual  from the community,  collective  action  must be
supported  by rational  or traditional  rules enacted  by governments  or arranged,  imposed,  or agreed
on within  the group. There are no homogeneous  or harmonious  communities  in real  life.
Participatory  decisionmaldng  can coalesce  heterogeneous  groups  by providing  agreement  on the
losses.  Individuals  would not need to move  to another  community  or form a new one.
Does Participation  Ensure the Best Interests of the Group?
The fact that decisions  are made collectively  does not mean  that they represent  the best interests
of the group.  Determining  whether  the decisions  represent  the group's best interest  is difficult
because  it requires  comparing  interpersonal  well-being,  whether  by aggregating  preferences  or
establishing  a hierarchy  of preferences.  Moreover,  it is not clear how  best to design,  implement,
and monitor an instrument  based on collective  action.  Participation  demands  regulation  by
government  action,  by those directly  involved  in the interaction,  or by both.'2
11It is useful to distinguish, as do Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970), between preemptory
and perfectible regulations. Consider a participatory decision on whether to establish a dental care
program at a school. Some of the parents that sit on the school's board of directors support the
idea of establishing the clinic. They are willing to conduct a survey, establish priorities, and
consult other members of the community before making a decision.
Opponents of the proposal believe that the school should not be responsible for dental
care and that policy matters that are not related to the school or its curriculum lie outside the
domain of the board, which should therefore not consider the issue. According to the opponents,
the school and its board have a clear preemptory function, which does not include conducting
surveys. Preemptory regulations rule out the possibility of participation since they are established
for the very purpose of excluding other courses of action. Groups who establish preemptory
values willingly tie their hands to support their central policy goal. (Examples of preemptory
regulations include such constitutional guarantees as freedom of speech and freedom of religion,
central policy goals that override other goals.)
In contrast, nonpreemptory regulations-regulations  that accommodate comparison, such
as a negotiated course of action-can  be improved by participation. Participation may also help
turn a preemptory stance into a negotiable position. In the United States, the civil rights
movement and the feminist movement changed constitutional rules. In nonpreemptory situations,
participation may improve the quality of public spending by promoting innovations or changes in
the government's plan. In El Salvador, rural school boards managed by the community now have
responsibility for the budget and administration of the schools; in the slums of Rio de Janeiro,
local water committees now share in the administration, design, and provision of services.
12In other cases, however, the outcome of participation is less certain. Participation itself
does not ensure sustainability.  Participation by a misinformed community group can distort public
policy.  13 It may lead to waste; for example, women cooperatives in Chiapas, Mexico, have made
costly and useless investments based on incorrect communally  held information. Participation
could be the key to environmental protection, but it may lead to very wrong technical decisions on
what and how to protect.14
Participation is a social act that springs from a preexisting set of social relations.  It
requires leadership and organization, attributes that must be created within the community and
that, ultimately, reflect its values and goals. Participation begins with trust and is, therefore, more
readily applied in situations that fortify communal  values. When it is used to achieve "radical"
(e.g., redistributive) outcomes, it typically seeks a redistribution from other groups to the group in
question, not redistributions within the group. For this very reason it can and should be regulated-
-to ensure its consistency with the broader norms and mores of society, including its legality. If an
indigenous community condemns women to illiteracy and is ruled by strictly patriarchal male-
dominated norms, participatory means can not be used to induce the community to offer
education for girls. What participation does allow, importantly, is for the adjustment of
nonpreemptory norms to the interests of the group.
Does Participation Strengthen  Individual Rights?
Submission, exclusion, and social dysfunctionality. If participation interprets demands it follows
pronouncement. In Hirschman's lexicon participation is voice, not exit-and  it is also loyalty.
More subtly, participation involves consent on acceptable losses; it solicits the postponement, or
even omission, of private interests (as reflected in such proverbial sayings as "act in haste, repent
13at leisure" or "look before you leap"). It requires good sense in that it should reflect customary
rather than idiosyncratic values.
An expansive social agreement is more stable, partly because it involves greater social
interaction. Participation helps expand a social agreement by counterbalancing the tendency of
individuals to form factions. If, however, fewer factions leads to bounded liberties, as James
Madison hoped it would, the political task of organizing common views is to identify and
consolidate factions. Consolidation involves the acceptance of social norms for arbitrating
interests, and it involves consent on acceptable losses of private interests. In order to generate
demands that are intelligible, appropriate, and legitimate for the appointed social order,
participation represses some claims. It is thus exclusionary-and  in this sense, as Kenneth Arrow
has observed (1997, page 761), it is closely related to markets.
In a way, the law-governed state and the market are very similar. Both are
impersonal systems, in which individual differences are suppressed or at least not
allowed to influence results. It is not merely that individuals have needs. Because
they are distinct, they have different needs. But neither the market nor the state can
really allow for these differences, except by permitting a private sphere in which
neither operates. (The market allows for individual choice in consumption, but not
for the fact that the distribution of income by no means corresponds to needs.)
Participation may be either unnecessary or disruptive-market  and/or administrative
solutions might be better. Consider, for example, activity within a firm. What transpires within the
14firm  is not mediated  by standard  market  mechanisms,  but it is closely  linked  with what goes on
outside  the firm.  As Marx showed  in his analysis  of the factory  system,  the most effective  systems
of management  within  the firm  (those  that have  survived  historically)  mimic  the systems  used to
determine  actions  in the external  environment.
For instance,  firms  often  pay wages  in excess  of opportunity  costs (the efficiency  wage
theory).  They do so not for altruistic  or paternalist  reasons  but because  they  recognize  that higher
wages  induce  greater effort  by motivating  workers  to work harder.  Higher  wages also  benefit
management  in other ways  (by increasing  selectivity  in hiring  and reducing  turnover,  for example).
The complex  system  of rules determining  rights,  responsibilities,  rewards,  and arbitration  of
disputes  and conflicting  interests  affects  the firm's bottom line  by increasing  productivity  and
profits.
Observing  how decisions  are made in practice  might  thus furnish  lessons  on the right  way
to make  "local" distributive  decisions.  We would  like  to think that local institutions  evolve
endogenously  to serve  more than  individual  ambitions.  The question  is, do local institutions
improve  social  outcomes?  Do they reflect  adequately  the distribution  of local wants and  needs?
There are no simple  answers  to these questions;  local institutions  may  improve  collective  welfare
but not necessarily  or even  usually.
It is difficult  to show  that more  participatory  schemes  outperform  less participatory
schemes,  when there is the option of using either  one or the other.  For example,  participatory
"quality  control  circles"  were introduced  by many  firms  in response  to increasingly  complex,
interconnected  tasks. The outcome  has been  uneven.  At some  level,  giving  workers  a greater
autonomy  increases  productivity  and workers' satisfaction.  But the system  demands  new  forms of
15hierarchy, and it is difficult to generalize the positive association between worker control and
output for all jobs. It is even harder to show that social innovations, such as "quality control
groups" or "neighborhood associations," are evolutionary steps that progress "naturally" to
desired or generally accepted social outcomes. In particular, we know that schemes developed to
address market failure may become dysfunctional after the market begins to work better, since
they can distort the operation of markets and reduce welfare.
To see why this is so, consider Arnott and Stiglitz's (1991) classic example of the market
for automobile insurance. One way in which the insurance market responds to moral hazard is to
require copayments in order to provide individuals with incentives to avoid accidents. But the
need to make copayments means that individuals purchase less insurance than they otherwise
would. To obtain the level of coverage they would have had in the absence of coinsurance, they
may enter into nonmarket mutual insurance agreements. Marriage, in which each spouse implicitly
(sometimes explicitly) insures the other, may represent one such mechanism.
Can a normative position on this arrangement be developed that is socially optimal?
Whatever its other merits, marriage is not the best way to provide automobile insurance. Not, that
is, unless both spouses agree that their utility is fully interdependent (each always acting as if the
other's utility depended on his or her efforts), each spouse can monitor the other perfectly, and
both spouses agree to this monitoring system and the sanctions it implies-an  unconventional
marriage indeed.
Nonmarket insurance is suboptimal because for market insurance to work efficiently the
quantity of insurance provided by insurance companies must be less than the quantity of insurance
demanded by drivers. If this condition is not met, drivers would face no financial incentive to
16avoid  accidents.  Recognizing  that spouses  provide  each other with some  nonmarket  insurance,
insurance  companies  reduce  the quantity  of insurance  they offer.  In the end  the total quantity  of
insurance  provided  is unchanged,  but it is provided  at a higher  cost than  it would  have  been  had
insurance  companies  been  the sole providers  of insurance,  because  insurance  companies  are better
able  than spouses  to pool risks and  thus to lower  costs.
In this example,  nonmarket  participatory  insurance  is harmful  and dysfunctional  since  it
cannot  improve  on the equilibrium  achieved  without  nonmarket  insurance.  The provision  of
nonmarket  insurance  does not enhance  the risk-sharing  capabilities  of the economy.  Instead,  it
simply  crowds out market insurance.  The simultaneous  provision  of market and nonmarket
insurance  also violates  exclusivity  (the need for insurers  to limit  the quantity  of insurance),  which
typically  creates negative  externalizes  that cannot  be internalized  and therefore  lead  to higher
costs.
The example  vividly  illustrates  the functionalism  fallacy:  the fact  that an institution
(nonmarket  insurance)  has a clearly  identifiable  function  (to improve  risk sharing  by
supplementing  the rationed  insurance  provided  by the market)  does not mean  that it actually
performs  that function.
Local rules and local  justice. The ways in which  people  sort out the problems  of
allocation  and distribution  are varied  and complicated.  Collective,  participatory  decisions  should,
but frequently  fail to, confront  justice and fairness.  Elster (1991) and  Elster and  Roemer (1991)
have examined  justice at the level  of the community,  the group, and  the firm, studying  decisions
on selecting  organ  transplant  recipients,  admitting  students  to institutions  of higher  learning,
17allocating  public  resources,  selecting  workers  to be laid off in a retrenchment  program, and
distributing  "protection  money"  received  from local drug lords. There are no optimal  solutions.
Doctors and other specialist  allocators  do not see their role as that of redressing  social
injustice.  They  are specialized  providers  of specific  services,  not promoters  of overall
welfare.  They  may  be willing  to compensate  for bad luck that falls  within  their specific
domain  but not for bad luck overall.  A person  in need  of a kidney  may  be compensated  for
kidney-related  bad luck,  but usually  not for other kinds  of medical  bad luck, and definitely
not for nonmedical  bad luck.  If the specialists  are aware  that there is a bigger  picture,  they
leave  it to others. Often,  however,  nobody  feels  responsible  for the big picture.  The many
local  justice decisions  that are made  by different  institutions  with respect  to the same
individual  can add up to a global  injustice  (Elster 1991,  p. 126).
Eis conclusions  are not encouraging:
The main  impression  is that it is a messy  business.  Usually  the institution  acknowledges
that more  than one feature  of the individual  is relevant  for the allocation  decision.
Sometimes  . .. explicit  weights  are assigned  to the various  features.  More frequently,  this
weighting  is left to the discretionary  decision  of the administrators.  Often,  there is some
discrepancy  between  the official  principles  and actual  practice.  Sometimes,  tortuous
explanations  are given  to reconcile  practice  and principle  ....  More frequently,  the
principles  are  just violated  in secret.  Reaching  agreement  on a principle  is often achieved
18at the cost of some  vagueness  about  interpretation  and implementation  (Elster  1991,  p.
114).
Historically,  of course, pacts were made and collective  action  assumed  definite  forms.
Most of these pacts involved  coercion;  much  of classical  philosophy  is devoted  to the search  for
balance  between confidence  and compulsion.  It would  be presumptuous  to deny the lessons  from
this distinguished  history.  But if the search  must be made  in this context,  it is hard to believe  that
it would  be conclusive.  Arrow  (1975) has noted that individuals  may  derive  satisfaction  from
someone  else's gain.  Camaraderie  allows  for complex  social  contracts,  of which  participatory
schemes  are a prime  example.  But there are narrow  limits  to camaraderie.  What guarantees  that
the agreements  will  be respected?  Why share  burdens  and costs and not free-ride  on the
achievements  of others?  What enforces  reputation,  and how do we live  in the minds  of others?
There is one consolation:  The fact that the decisionmaking  process  is local does not make
it more or less  messy  than  when it is not. The fact that decisions  are made  by highly  qualified
people  such as deans,  doctors, and entrepreneurs  does not ensure  the quality,  fairness,  or
transparency  of decisions.  A growing  body of microevidence  suggests  that if the interested  parties
(for example,  students,  administrators,  teachers)  are represented  in the decisionmaking  process
and "own" its outcome,  then autocratic  decisions,  so common  in technocratic  bodies,  can be
avoided  and outcomes  can be less messy.
19Conclusion
Participation  is as much  a problem  as it is a solution,  as much a goal as an instrument.  It is a
problem  when it is disorderly  and  it is a big problem  if it is assumed  to be a substitute  for
democratic  representation.  It is a solution  when it changes  conflict  into negotiated  losses.
Participation  can make development  assistance  more effective.  But it works best for groups  that
are already  able  to help  themselves.
The recent  literature  on the effectiveness  of foreign  aid to developing  countries  presents
an interesting  analogy  to the findings  on participation.  Most foreign  aid is useless;  the only  portion
that really  helps  development  is that which  follows  rather than leads  policy  change  (Burnside  and
Dollar 1997).  Similarly,  participation  seems  to work well  only  when the institutions  of
participation  are in place  before  the need  they address  arises  and  when the institutions  are
compatible  with its objectives.  These  conditions,  as discussed,  are not easily  met.
Questions  about participation  cannot  avoid  the issue of political  power,  local power,
populism,  and representation.  They cannot  avoid  issues  of moral  pluralism  (the variety  of ways in
which  people  could  value  their lives)  or cultural  diversity.  They  cannot dismiss  the ways  in which
people  can be blocked  from better lives  by the beliefs  of their cultures.  They  cannot  avoid the
pressure  that a dominant  group may  exert to forge solutions  that are morally  unacceptable.
So, after all this, do we conclude  that these problems  are banal,  the stuff of introductory
courses  in public  policy?  Perhaps.  But even  if banal,  these problems  are not irrelevant  or
unimportant.  Efforts  to promote  participation  would  seem  strikingly  banal  were  the history  of
development  efforts  not replete  with  failures  to achieve  participation  where  it would  have  made  a
20difference.  It has typically  been assumed  that people, especially  poor people, lack the competence  to
decide for themselves.
Likewise,  the failures  of participation  would seem strikingly  banal if people, especially  those we
are interested  in, behaved the way we expected  them to behave.  In fact people do not behave  as
expected. Their interests may not be in the collective  interest and their goals may not coincide  with
broader social  goals.
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¶ The  Alliance  for Progress,  launched  in the early 1960s,  was strongly  influenced  by the then prevailing  ideas on
"community  development"  and by the "self-help"  ideology  of the Papal Encyclical  Mater etMagistra. (On this,
see Gordon  (1963),  esp. pp.12-13). As examined  by Riordan  Roett  (1972),  the program failed  famously.
2 The question  is what rights. One idea is that a person should  have the right to what she produces.  Production,
however,  requires  the inputs and collaboration  of others.  It is essential  to apportion  the claims  pre-dating
production.  The distribution  of output  is based on the prior definition  of property  rights and of entitlements-and
the "natural"  distribution  of entitlements  may not be desirable  to all.
Another idea is to choose  rights that maximize  social  welfare  based  on individual  utility maximization.
But, as is well  known,  this idea also fails to answer  the question  of what rights. We cannot compare  levels of utility
because  it is impossible  to aggregate  individual  bundles of utility  without  infringing  some simple common-sense
rules. Thus, the question  of when one set of rights ought  to be considered  socially  preferred  cannot  be answered,
strictly  (see  Elster and Roemer,  1991  for an extensive  discussion).
Still another idea is to base  the choice  of rights on the social  definition  of what is fair-and  use  this
ranking to order social  preferences.  In the sense  of nonenvy,  fairness  is an attractive  concept.  But, on further
thought, "fairness"  is at odds  with social  improvement.  I will not think it fair to give  you money  now if this means
that I give  up the possibility  of having more  money  in the future. These  problems  are well known  and have  been
around  for some  time (see  Broadway  and Bruce 1984,  chapter 5).
It was Rawls' (1971)  seminal  contribution  to have  developed  a notion  of justice  that addresses  these
shortcomings,  answering  the question  "what rights?' Rawls' approach  is to use a set of ethical postulates  to define
welfare:  "liberty,  opportunity  and a sense  of our own value" are primary  goods  and their loss is absolute  (1971:
400). They  are not negotiable  and no amount  of material  goods can compensate  their loss. Justice  follows,  as a
supporting  construction,  formed  by rights  based on rationality  at the individual  or household  level (see  Feldman
1980  for an extensive  discussion).  Because  opportunity  is a primary  good,  as is the liberty  to demand  opportunity,
opportunities  derived  from "a sense  of our own  value" are norms  that govern  rights. New  rights thus imply  new
opportunities.  To demand  or to bestow  opportunities  is to subscribe  to and accept  a new right. A demand  for a new
right, or for the extension  of established  rights to a new social  group, is an innovation  in the social  order; it
requires  a new contract;  new norms  of distribution.
Rawls' theory  has been crticized on several  grounds.  First there is an important  and problematic
consequence. Justice can exist only for those who subscribe to the norms. If the social order is summarized in a
given welfare  function,  opportunities,  conceived  as norms or social  rules,  exist as such only  to the people
subscribing  to this function. One must accept  what there is to demand  it (Hollis  1996  outlines  the critique).
Moreover,  an equitable  distribution  of primary  goods  may  not assure  equity. Sen  has observed  that, "With
the same  bundle  of primary  goods,  a pregnant  woman  or one with infants  to look  after has much less  freedom  to
pursue her goals than a man not thus encumbered  would  be able to do." (Sen (1992),  page 27. This has led him to
focus  onfunctionings  and capabilities  as a basis  for freedom  to choose,  hence  justice.
Functionings  are what people  want to do,
The relevant  functionings  can vary  from such  elementary  things as being adequately
nourished,  being in good  health,  avoiding  escapable  morbidity  and premature
mortality,  etc., to more  complex  achievements  such as being happy,  having self-
respect,  taking  part in the life of the community,  and so on. The claim is that
functionings  are constitutive  of a person's  being, and an evaluation  of well-being  has
to take the form of an assessment  of these  constituent  elements  (Sen, 1992,  page 39).
Finally,  Rawlsian  rationality  is not only  inadequate  but faulty, as Arrow  (1973)  indicated  early on. Rawls'
welfare  function  is attractive  because  it is not only  rational  (utility  maximizing).  In it, households  base their
choices  on the utility of the worst-off  household.  The problem  is that to derive  this function  Rawls  presumes  that
individuals  act with a "veil of ignorance"  that shades  interpersonal  comparisons.  Person x might  know that in state
F there is one millionaire  and one pauper,  but she  does not know whether she  would  be the millionaire  or the
pauper.  In ignorance,  she opts for an option  where  she is guaranteed  a tolerable  level of wealth; i.e., the state thatmaximizes  the well-being  of the person in the worst  position.  This does not mesh well with usual behavior.  Most  of
us, when faced  with the choice  between  a = (30, 30, 30) and P = (20, 100, 100),  would  chose P.
3The  "correct"  distribution  of rights (i.e. equity as expressed,  for example,  in Rawls' social  welfare  function)  is
commonly  understood  as the balance  between  justice  and efficiency.  It is a form of social  security  for excessive
violations  of the these two  opposing  forces;  violations  which may lead losers  to give  up or to revolt. The
consequences,  in both cases,  will seriously  affect  the functioning  of the group.  Apathy  is dangerous  because  it
encourages  resignation.  Arguably,  this would  not be a concern  if apathy were random  or proportionally  distributed
in the social structure.  It is not. Schatschneider  (1970),  for example,  finds that it is the rich who  preponderantly
have the motivation,  the time and the resources  for participating  in social  and political  life. Thus apathy may  lead
to the loss of politics. And though  rebellion  may  alter a situation  of inequality,  it will do so only  if the oppressed
win, which seldom  happens;  more often,  rebellion  will call for retaliation. Winners  regularly  learn that there is a
point of frustration  that may tear the weave  of solidarity  mechanisms  holding  the group  together;  thus, sometimes,
the threat of rebellion  may be sufficient  to prompt a redistribution  of rights.
4 Yet, the right of women  to vote was,  in many places,  an acquired  right, bitterly  fought  for.
5 David Thomson  (1967,  page 194) notes  that: "In Germany  Bismarck  had shown  that one way to revive
Conservatism  was to adopt a policy  of social  reform,  and that one way to pay for social  services  was through  a
policy  of fiscal [trade]  protection."  To the extent  that this policy  was copied  by other  European states  and, to the
extent  that it lead to a slow-down  in overall  growth,  one  could argue that, at its inception,  the policy  of social
welfare  plighted "insiders"  with newly  acquired  expanded  rights against  "outsiders"  with newly  erected  barriers  to
conquer.
6On  work-rules  see, ; on professional  self-enforcement  see, ; on the Viva-Rio  movement  see, ;on  the recent  Boston
experience,  see . The counterfactual  to these  examples  are the many experiences  where  the physical  destruction  of a
community  lead to social  anomie;  the classic reference  is Gans (19XX)-a  hallmark of the 1960s  academic  reaction
against technocratic  planning  and one of the most influential  works  in the revival  of "community  based"
approaches  to social  problems.
7 See  Braybrooke  (1987) for a cogent defense  of "needs  based" assessments  in social  policy.  However,  as Brock
(1994) points  out in his review,  Braybrooke's  method  "requires  insupportable  assumptions  that need not
necessarily  result in any consensus,  let alone  the most equitable  outcomes  for all. Without  an enhanced  method  for
settling  questions  concerning  needs,  Braybrooke's  project  has come  to a standstill..."
*  The efficiency  case  for decentralization  in the provision  of public  goods and services  was developed  by, inter alia,
Tiebout  (1961) and Oates (1972).
9 A pure public  good  is one which  exhibits  both  non-excludability  in production  (it is impossible  to exclude  from
benefit  a person who refuses  to contribute  to the cost) and non-rivary in consumption  (one  person's consumption
does not reduce  the amount available  for others).
10  The extension,  however,  is neither  as simple or mechanical  as this parenthetical  statement  may imply. The
political-economy  implications  of the philosophy  that "where  the benefit  of a particular service  is clearly
identifiable  as going to the particular  individual,  then there is a good  case  for that individual  paying  the price and
choosing  whether  or not he takes  the benefit  of that service"  is developed  in Buchanan  and Tullock's  classic  text
(1962  ), and applied more  rigorously  to bureaucratic  behavior  by Niskanen  (1971).
"1 The foundation  of the United States  illustrates  both alternatives,  exit (displacement)  and voice  (remain  but re-
contract).  The demand  for religious  freedom  not found  in the monopolistic  situation  of origin expelled  the first
colonizers  who  formed  a new community  with different  rules based  on diversity.  The search  for stability  inspired
the initial 13 colonies  to negotiate  their differences,  establish  new priorities,  transfer  previous  rights, and contract  a
nation  in a Locke-type  solution.
2512Regulation also precedes markets, a fact well recognized by Adam Smith (see Sen 1987). The point is that this
same sequencing is demanded for effective participation.
13 A recent and fascinating example is the web of relationships behind the assassination of PRI's  secretary-general,
Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu. As Guillermoprieto (1997) explains, this has come to involve a soothsayer linked to
then President Salinas' brother, Raul. "Long before La Paca became a soothsayer, she played her own small part in
Mexican politics. There are newscast images of her ... in the aftennath  of a squatters'  action she helped coordinate.
... There was a prescribed form for these confrontations, which was followed in 1982 by Francisca Zetina-as  La
Paca was still known-and  some five thousand squatters she had helped to muster: they squatted, the government
sent in the riot police, and La Paca negotiated. In normal circumstances, the government would have paid off the
land's original owners, La Paca would have received some portion of the occupied land to parcel out among her
followers, a new shantytown would have been born and baptized in honor of a local PRI politician  ....  [But in this
particular  case something went wrong.] ... the local authority was asking for too much-a  house on the occupied
land and a car-in  exchange for his protection."
14 One study found that the rankings of the perceived health impacts of various environmental hazards by scientists
and nonscientists were uncorrelated, suggesting that participation by nonscientists would not improve outcomes
(Environmental Protection Agency 1987; Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic l9xx).
26Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1815  Unfair Trade? Empirical Evidence in  Jacques Morisset  August 1997  N. Busjeet
World  Commodity Markets Over  33997
the Past 25 Years
WPS1816  Returns to Regionalism: An  Raquel Fernandez  August 1997  J. Ngaine
Evaluation of Nontraditional  Gains  37947
from Regional Trade Agreements
WPS1 817 Should Core Labor Standards Be  Keith E. Maskus  August  1997  J. Ngaine
Imposed through  International Trade  37947
Policy?
WPS1818  What Affects the Russian Regional  Lev Freinkman  August  1997  N. Campos
Governments' Propensity to  Michael Haney  38541
Subsidize?
WPS1819  The Argentine Pension Reform and  Dimitri Vittas  August 1997  P. Infante
Its Relevance for Eastern Europe  37642
WPS1 820 Private Pension Funds in Argentina's  Dimitri Vittas  August 1997  P. Infante
New Integrated Pension System  37642
WPS1821  The 'IPO-Plus": A New Approach to  Itzhak Goldberg  August 1997  1.  Goldberg
Privatization  Gregory Jedrzejczak  36289
Michael Fuchs
WPS1822  Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers  Jun Ma  September 1997  C. Ima
in Nine Countries: Lessons for  35856
Developing Countries
WPS1823  Antidumping  in Law and Practice  Raj Krishna  September 1997  A. Bobbio
81518
WPS1824  Winners and Losers from Utility  Omar Chisari  September 1997  T. Malone
Privatization in Argentina: Lessons  Antonio Estache  37198
from a General Equilibrium  Model  Carlos Romero
WPSI 825 Current Accounts in Debtor and  Aart Kraay  September 1997  R. Martin
Creditor Countries  Jaume Ventura  39026
WPS1 826 Standards and Conformity  Sherry M. Stephenson  September 1997  M. Pateria
Assessment as Nontariff  39515
Barriers to Trade
WPSI 827 The Determinants of Agricultural  Yair Mundlak  September 1997  P. Kokila
Production: A Cross-Country  Don Larson  33716
Analysis  Ritz ButzerPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1  828 The  Determinants  of Banking  Crises:  Asli Demirg0g-Kunt  September  1997  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Evidence  from Developed  and  Enrica  Detragiache  38526
Developing  Countries
WPS1829 Economic  Reform  and progress  in  Norman  Loayza  September  1997  E. Khine
Latin  America  and the Caribbean  Luisa Palacios  37471
WPS1830 Private  Ownership  and Corporate  Roman  Frydman  September  1997  B. Moore
Performance:  Some  Lessons  from  Cheryl  W. Gray  38526
Transition Economies  Marek Hessel
Andrzej  Rapaczynski
WPS1831 How Trade  Patterns  and  Technology Wolfgang  Keller  September  1997  J. Ngaine
Flows  Affect Productivity  Growth  37947
WPS1832 Pension  Reform  in Bolivia:  Innovative  Hermann  von Gersdorff  September  1997  C. Pavlak
Solutions  to Common  Problems  82099
WPS1833 Cost Recovery  and Pricing  of  David  B. Humphrey  October  1997  T. Ishibe
Payment  Services  Robert  H. Keppler  38968
Fernando  Montes-Negret
WPS1834 The  Comparative  Advantage  of  Pedro  Belli  October  1997  L. Schunk
Government:  A Review  31779
WPS1835 Cost-Benefit  Analysis  of the Global  Aehyung  Kim  October  1997  A. Kim
Dracunculiasis  Eradication  Campaign  Ajay  Tandon  35029
Ernesto  Ruiz-Tiben
WPS1836 Health  and Labor  Productivity:  The  Aehyung  Kim  October  1997  A. Kim
Economic  Impact  of Onchocercal  Ajay  Tandon  35029
Skin Disease  Asrat  Hairu and  Others
WPS1837 How Estonia's  Economic  Transition  Rivo Noorkoiv  October  1997  S. Fallon
Affected  Employment  and  Wages  Peter  F. Orazem  38009
(1989-95)  Allan  Puur
Milan  Vodopivec